Freedom in an Unfree Universe

Is it possible that God could know everything including the future, yet we retain our free will despite this? In this essay, I argue that omniscience is a logically coherent concept, even in the face of contradictions like the paradox of foreknowledge and free will.

Firstly, I will briefly define what the term omniscience means. The Merriam-Webster (2022) dictionary offers two definitions:

1. having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight.

2. possessing universal or complete knowledge.

Based upon these definitions, an omniscient being would possess complete knowledge of the future – this is called foreknowledge. For the sake of brevity, we will call this omniscient being possessing foreknowledge God. The notion that God is omniscient is a tenet of Abrahamic and monotheistic religions worldwide and is hardly a new idea.

However, there are some possible logical contradictions with this concept. The first contradiction to arise is the paradox of divine foreknowledge. It states:

• An omniscient God has foreknowledge of everything I will do.

• If God knows what I am going to do, then I am not free to choose what I will do in the future.

• The existence of an omniscient God is incompatible with free choice/free will.

Formalised, this paradox states:

1. Omniscience must include foreknowledge.

2. Foreknowledge depends on determinism.

3. Determinism is incompatible with free will.

C. Omniscience is incompatible with free will.

There are several responses to this proposition.

One counterargument is to ‘deny’ omniscience including foreknowledge. It argues that God is beyond time, and that foreknowledge is a concept that can only exist within time. If God truly is beyond time, then the notion that God would use a limited perspective i.e., our human perspective to perceive time makes little sense. It is a way of saying omniscience does not have to include foreknowledge, because omniscience and foreknowledge are arguably two completely different concepts. This position is sometimes known as metaphysical libertarianism (Wickingson, 2022) or ‘limited omniscience.’ Metaphysical libertarians usually believe free will is not compatible with any sort of determinism. We either have free will in an undetermined universe, or no free will in a completely determined universe.

However, I do not think this is a satisfying explanation. One reason being the term ‘limited omniscience’ is an oxymoron (a self-contradiction.) I also think differentiating omniscience from foreknowledge is splitting hairs unnecessarily. I think the concepts are deeply interlinked and are inseparable. Omniscience is 'knowing-all' and foreknowledge is 'knowing the future.' To me, foreknowledge is just a subset of omniscience, not a different concept.

And omniscience is beyond time but foreknowledge is within time? How so? And surely an omniscient God could possess both foreknowledge and omniscience. Plus, a God who possesses omniscience without foreknowledge is not omniscient. To me, limited omniscience is not an answer.

Furthermore I believe free will and determinism are compatible with one another. More on this later.

Another counterargument goes along similar lines: if an omniscient God created time, then He is not within time. So to think of God within all time is completely wrong. Thus, viewing God as needing time-based foreknowledge is also wrong, because His omniscience is complete to begin with. God does not need time to foresee - He sees everything simultaneously: past, present and future. It is just a different approach to the first counterargument above. It is saying God already possesses foreknowledge, because omniscience is a much more 'powerful' trait than pure foreknowledge so to speak.

Kant (1787) echoes this thought in his Critique of Pure Reason. In summary, he states cause and effect occurs within time and space but do not apply outside of it. In other words, God's foreknowledge does not depend on the physical universe, because He is already omniscient and beyond time, space, the universe, etc.

These arguments are a little closer to the mark, but they do not fully address the problem of free will. Many can accept the notion of God knowing everything in advance due to God being omniscient... but how does that allow for people to make free decisions? If God knows what I am going to do beforehand, does that mean I have any free choice at all?

Another argument argues for compatibilism: the belief that free will and determinism can coexist. And some argue compatibilism also applies to an omniscient God foreseeing pre-determined events. It argues that omniscience and determinism can coexist. Just because events can be predetermined does not mean people have no choice in reacting to these events. Why? Because one can argue that God’s omniscience is so colossal, so complete, so beyond comprehension that He knows what any person will ever do at any point in time: past, present and the future. After all, if we use Merriam-Webster’s (2022) definition of omniscience as infinite knowledge, surely an infinite being could foresee a finite number of possibilities, including which will happen? This argument could be formalised as:

1. Causes and effects are determined.

2. There can only be a finite number of causes and effects in a finite universe.

3. An omniscient being (God) can understand all causes and effects across all of time.

4. An omniscient God is beyond space and time.

C. An omniscient God can exist beyond a determined universe.

One’s view on free will is not related to the logical consistency of this argument; it is coherent whether someone is a determinist, fatalist or a compatibilist. However, it does depend on the notion of an omniscient God, something which is unprovable nor disprovable. I am not claiming this proposition is true, only logically coherent. That God can exist alongside a determined universe.

But what about free will? Can I be free if God knows what I am going to do? In other words, can the ideas of compatibilism and omniscience coexist? Can we have a universe with predetermined events, free choice and a God who knows what will happen?

Atkinson (2013) would disagree with me. He states that if God could calculate anything we do, then the free will we have is nothing more than an illusion. In other words, he believes any choice that is foretold by God or by the laws of the universe is not really a choice. It seems then that for Atkinson, there is no possibility of compatibilism existing – we can only be wholly free or wholly unfree, without much wiggle room in between. It mirrors metaphysical libertarianism, but comes to very different conclusions. Atkinson believes that free will cannot exist with an omniscient God. If God is omniscient, then we are not free. We can only be free without God.

My compatibilist position is different. It is similar to a position called Molinism, named after Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina (1588.) He posited that the one and only omniscient God has knowledge of all the counterfactuals (what could, would and should happen.) And just because God knows all these things does not impede on a person's free will. Events are often determined, but reactions are not. Molina dubbed this tension of knowledge between both all that could happen and what will happen 'middle knowledge' or 'scientia media' in Latin. My view is similar to Molina's, though not identical... How much free will we have and how much events are predetermined is virtually impossible to calculate, let alone ever understand. Are we slightly free and mostly unfree? Are we mostly free to shape the future with only one or two things pre-determined in advance? Or is the divide between free will and determinism 50/50? I do not know and nor does anybody else. However, any degree of freedom we have is freedom, no matter how much or little we have.

This 'degree of freedom' even applies to animals: animals are easier to predict than people, so we likely have more foreknowledge about animals than we do about human behaviour. But there's still a streak of unpredictability even with animals. For example, if I go to pet a dog I encounter on the street, I can never be 100% sure about how he will react to me. If his behaviour was entirely predetermined, I might be 100% sure beforehand of his reaction with enough knowledge about canine behaviour, breeds, etc... but the idea that I could calculate a dog's reaction with 100% certainty seems preposterous. A dog could bite me, snarl at me, accept me, sniff me, or maybe do something else entirely. I have no real way of foreknowing, even with a lot of knowledge about dogs beforehand.

And because there is an undetermined part of the dog's behaviour, that 'room for error', that 'degree of freedom', that 'fog' of never quite knowing how he will react strongly implies that even a dog has some free will. Yes, there may be only a limited number of things the dog can do - smile, growl, lurch and so on... but do limited options mean that mean the dog has no decision making capacity? And just because an omniscient, foreknowing God knows what this specific dog will do, does that mean the dog has no freedom before him? It certainly seems like the dog has freedom - and it seems I have the freedom to choose whether I risk petting the dog on the street. It could be that God pre-determines I will meet the dog on the street, yet leaves the interaction in my hands and in the dogs 'paws'. Perhaps there is room for freedom in an unfree universe.

References

Merriam Webster (2022) Merriam-Webster online. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omniscient (Accessed 9 January 2022).

Molina, L. (1588) Concordia liberi arbitrii (Harmony of Free Will). Lisbon, Portugal.

Kant, I. (1787) Critique of Pure Reason. Königsberg (Kaliningrad), Russia.

Atkinson, S. (2013, February 5) Omniscience and free will. Lecture at Salt Lake Community College, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Wickingson, D. (2022) Can Free Will & God's Omniscience Coexist?. dwickingson.yolasite.com. Available at: http://dwickingson.yolasite.com/excerpt-phil-rel.php (Accessed 10 January 2022).