Heidegger on Anxiety, Angst and Fear

What is anxiety? How does it differ from fear and what is its phenomenological significance? Discuss in relation to Heidegger’s Being and Time.

Anxiety is defined by the American Psychological Association as “an emotion characterized by feelings of tension, worried thoughts, and physical changes like increased blood pressure, etc.” They further elaborate that “anxiety is considered a future-oriented, long-acting response broadly focused on a diffuse threat, whereas fear is an appropriate, present-oriented, and short-lived response to a clearly identifiable and specific threat.”” (APA, 2008, para. 3) This distinction between anxiety and fear being long-term and short-term oriented respectively is important in understanding Heidegger’s thought on anxiety. It is also important to remember that anxiety tends to focus on what the APA dub a ‘diffuse threat’ i.e., a threat that is a potential threat, things that could be a threat or even threats that are difficult to define e.g., feeling anxious about one’s lack of achievement in life.

Heidegger has a lot to say about anxiety in Being and Time (B&T.) His ideas on its causes, mechanics, and meaning are both sophisticated and insightful. However, to understand Heidegger’s ideas on anxiety it is vital to understand Heidegger’s most pivotal notion; the notion of Dasein. Dasein literally translates from German as ‘be there.’ Others think the word ‘being’ is a more accurate translation. For Heidegger, Dasein is “an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that being.” (Heidegger, 1927, p.78) Another way to define Dasein is ‘a being who has an understanding of being.’ It is also important to note Dasein is not the same as consciousness. For example, it is unlikely that a fish has a Dasein, because whilst fishes are conscious, react to their environment, etc. they do not appear to try and understand their own consciousness, nor reflect on what the essence of being a fish is. On the other hand, human beings are uniquely aware of their own consciousness, the mystery of their own being and sometimes ask what the essence of being a human is i.e., wondering what the best way of being a human is. It is fascinating to note that the very phrase we use to describe ourselves in English is human being, not a ‘human conscious’ or ‘human aware.’

This pernicious awareness of our own being and our Dasein (awareness of our being) is a cause of anxiety. For example, Heidegger titles one section of B&T “The Basic State-of-mind of Anxiety as a Distinctive Way in which Dasein is Disclosed.” (1927, §40) Heidegger believes anxiety is a way that Dasein confronts itself. He notes that there is a tendency for people to become absorbed in life and world around them, and that people often live less authentically than they could and probably should do. People can get lost on ‘the treadmill of life.’ Heidegger phrases this as “Dasein’s absorption in the ‘they’ and its absorption in the world of its concern.” (1927, p. 229) In simpler words, people live a life dictated to them by others (the ‘they’.)

He further elaborates that by living a conformable, inauthentic life of the ‘they,’ Dasein starts to flee from itself. Heidegger calls this Dasein’s ‘fleeing in the face of itself’ or Dasein ‘falling away from itself.’ (1927, p.229) This is when a person becomes disconnected from their own Dasein i.e., they become disconnected from their own authentic being, or their own ‘raison d’être’ as the French might say. This forces a person to confront their own Dasein, or as Heidegger puts it, Dasein is being ‘brought before itself.’ It is interesting to note that years before Heidegger’s thought, another existentialist philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, wrote about a strikingly similar cause and process of dealing with existential anxiety which a person must confront and address. He simply stated, “What does your conscience say? – ‘You shall become the person you are.’” (Nietzsche, 1882)

Dasein’s tendency to question itself often causes anxiety, and Heidegger notes that Dasein’s ‘falling’ process causes anxiety rather than fear. This is because ‘inauthenticity’ or the ‘They-self’ is not a concrete, immediate, short-term threat. Rather, existential anxiety (angst) is “future-oriented, long-acting [and] broadly focused on a diffuse threat.” (APA, 2008.) Heidegger describes this angst as ‘the face of which it flees is not grasped’ and that it is neither ‘turning away’ nor ‘turning thither’ or as he cutely writes in German, “abkehr, noch hinkehr.” (1927, p.229) The causes of angst are not physical, measurable or tangible, but many people do experience angst, albeit some more profoundly and deeply than others. The sense that something in their life is deeply off. Whilst Heidegger concedes that the vagueness and depth of angst caused by Dasein might not be physically real, he emphatically asserts that “Dasein exists factually.” (1927, p.225) In other words, angst can be just as real factually as fear from being in a room with a poisonous snake. Another way of putting it is Heidegger asserts that angst is phenomenologically real. 

Heidegger further elaborates upon angst by comparing it to fear, and he tries to explain both how they are similar to one another, but also different to one another. He admits that it “remains obscure how this [anxiety] is connected ontologically with fear’ and that anxiety and fear ‘are kindred phenomena.’ (1927, p.230) Nevertheless, he attempts to untangle the two states from one another. After some digging, Heidegger arrives at a strikingly similar conclusion to contemporary psychologists and neurologists. He asserts that fear ‘always comes from entities-within-the-world.’ He contrasts this with Dasein’s ‘falling’, ‘fleeing’, or ‘turning-away’ from itself, which is a ‘being-in-the-world’ rather than an ‘entity-in-the-world.’

Heidegger goes on to make an astute observation. After claiming that “in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite” (1927, p.321) he notes that this ‘indefiniteness’ causes yet another form of anxiety. Not only does anxiety remain ‘factually undecided’ about what ‘entities-in-the-world’ are threatening us, but anxiety can also tell us that entities in the world around us have no relevance at all, especially when we experience angst. Heidegger expands by saying that anxiety can dramatically change our perception of neutral objects around us. Objects that are ‘present-at-hand’ and ‘ready-to-hand’ (or in non-Heideggerian terminology, physical objects and their uses) will appear very differently to an anxious mind compared to a calmer mind.

Heidegger further distinguishes fear from anxiety. He points out several factors that contribute to fear’s causes and mechanics. Fear is often experienced in relation to something definite – this is in direct contrast to Heidegger’s description of anxiety being related to nothing tangible, or his frequent use of the word ‘indefinite’ to describe anxiety. Fear is also somewhat proportional to a person’s proximity towards what they fear (Heidegger uses the term ‘the fearsome’ to describe any entity someone fears.) For example, a person who sees a poisonous snake 50 ft away will not feel anywhere near as fearful as a snake that is merely 5 ft close to them. Again, this in stark contrast to angst, which is not proportional to anything observable. Angst is not measurable in relation to anything, whereas fear often is e.g., the snake example.

There is another way of conceptualising the difference between anxiety and fear. Fear is phenomenon that is caused from the outside, whereas anxiety and angst are caused from the inside. Heidegger believes that fear is caused by an encounter with an entity that “has something queer about it.” (1927, p.179) In contrast, angst is caused by Dasein looking at itself; it is caused within oneself, particularly at moments when Dasein ‘falls away from itself.’ However, this anxiety’s causes are very difficult to pin down on one cause or on any physical entity, as discussed above. This contrasts with “fear showing itself within a context of involvements.” Angst is not caused or ‘contextually involved’ with anything external. He elaborates by stating:

“That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterised by the fact that what threatens it is nowhere. Anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is anxious is. ‘Nowhere’, however, does not signify nothing…” (Heidegger, 1927, p.231)

From Heidegger’s perspective, anxiety is ‘that which gives Dasein insight into the nature of its own being.’ Anxiety is an uncomfortable experience from a phenomenological perspective, but it is also a very useful tool to become more self-aware and to live more authentically. Heidegger himself says that:

“…in orienting our analysis by the phenomenon of falling, we are not in principle condemned to be without any prospect of learning something ontologically about the Dasein enclosed in that phenomenon.” (1927, p. 229)

Heidegger touches upon this idea of ‘learning from angst’ several times in B&T, and various philosophers, authors and commentators have interpreted Heidegger’s ideas on the significance of anxiety on a person’s psychology and phenomenology. 

In his journal article, Whalen (2015) states that anxiety is like no other mood from a Heideggerian perspective. Whilst every mood we experience attunes Dasein in its engagement with the world, anxiety is the sole exception which actively undermines Dasein’s engagement with the world. In Heidegger’s own words, anxiety forces Dasein to ‘flee in the face of itself.’ By doing this, Dasein is forced to question itself, in how it is related to the environment around it according to Whalen. He further explains how anxiety can manifest as different emotions – including guilt, resoluteness and the ‘call of conscience’ are all manifestations of anxiety caused by Dasein’s falling. Furthermore, Whalen makes another observation – he believes Heidegger’s concept of Being-towards-death (1927, p.227) is fuelled by existential anxiety. Because Being-towards-death is the life-long process of growing through the world towards a more authentic life that suits oneself, it is driven on by anxiety over death. One could argue that Being-towards-death and angst are also driven by the anxiety of living a wasted, unlived life.

J.M. Magrini (2006) interprets Heidegger’s philosophy of anxiety and anxiety’s significance in a similar way to Whalen. Magrini dubs anxiety ‘the harbinger of authenticity.’ By this, he means that whilst anxiety is a ‘highly disturbing’ experience, anxiety holds the potential for enlightenment and positive change in a person. One way it does this is through becoming aware of the limited time we have, and as Heidegger notes, anxiety changes Dasein’s engagement with the world by changing how we see things i.e., things that were once ready-to-hand often become meaningless when we feel anxious. For example, a snack we enjoy might no longer be appetising in a state of angst. If nothing matters, why eat anymore? It is no wonder that anxiety is an unpleasant emotion that people try to avoid. However, Magrini argues that “anxiety is the single most important mode of human attunement that Heidegger describes.” Without anxiety, one cannot become truly human or free. Without anxiety, one cannot live up to their full potential. Heidegger himself says “anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.” (1927, p.232)

Matthew Shockey (2006) has a different view on anxiety’s phenomenological significance in Heidegger’s philosophy. Anxiety is a mood anybody can feel, philosopher or not, and he mentions that it is often caused by ‘a significant breakdown in the living of their life.’ Life will always throw its curveballs, and nobody can escape ‘the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.’ Shockley goes on to argue that anxiety has an ontological cause too i.e., angst is caused by a person asking ontological questions about themselves. By doing this, a person is imagining a crisis or breakdown and withdrawing from their position of engaging with the world normally. Such a violent break with the normal way of behaving in the world provoke deep feelings of anxiety and angst. This is Shockley’s description of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s ‘falling’ and ‘fleeing away from itself.’ 

To conclude, it seems that anxiety’s phenomenological significance is its ability to ‘attune’ Dasein into becoming a more authentic person and its ability to push people into living a more purposeful life. Heidegger himself says:

“Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its being towards its own potentiality-for-Being – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.” (1927, p.232)

In other words, anxiety is there to force someone to take hold of themselves, reflect upon what they ought to do with their time and push them forwards into doing it.

References

American Psychological Association. (2008) Anxiety. Available at: https://www.apa.org/topics/anxiety (Accessed: April 22, 2023). 

Heidegger, M. et al. (2013) Being and Time. Blackwell. 

Magrini, J. (2006) ‘“Anxiety” in Heidegger’s Being and Time: The Harbinger of Authenticity’. Philosophy Scholarship 15.

Nietzsche, F.W. et al. (2020) The Gay Science. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc. 

Whalen, J.T. (2015) ‘Anxiety, the Most Revelatory of Moods’. Akadimia Filosofia 1(1)